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Ethical Preferences and the Assessment of 
Existence Values: Does the Neoclassical 
Model Fit? 
Steven F. Edwards 
Some of the implications of ethical preferences for traditional welfare analyses of existence values 
are discussed in this paper and illustrated with a lexicographic model for preference structures. 
Although willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-sell are well-defined, their connection with Hicksian 
surpluses is lost when a person is motivated by an ethical commitment to others
1 welfare. 
Researchers need to expand contingent valuation methods to collect information on underlying 
motives and types of preferences in order to identify respondents who fit the neoclassical model of 
egoistic man. 
Introduction 
There is a small but growing movement within 
the economics profession to bridge the gaps 
between environmental economics and envi-
ronmental ethics. The approach that receives 
most attention takes economic values for indi-
viduals as given and contrasts the implications 
of alternative humanistic ethics—utilitarian-
ism, egalitarianism, elitism, libertarianism— 
for social discounting when environmental 
risks are large or when impacts of a policy are 
spread across many generations (Schulze and 
Kneese; Schulze, Brookshire and Sandier). 
Another approach, but one that has not re-
ceived much attention in the environmental 
economics literature, contrasts egoistic and 
ethical preferences of individuals as founda-
tions for value analysis (Sen 1973, 1977, 1979). 
This paper extends Sen's work in a discussion 
of the implications of ethical preferences for 
estimating existence values for wildlife and fu-
ture generations from contingent valuation 
data. 
In Section II egoistic preferences are con- 
Economist with Marine Policy and Ocean Management Center, 
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Massachu-' 
setts. Research funding was provided by the J. N. Pew, Jr. Charitable 
Trust and the Marine Policy  Center of the Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institution (Contribution Number 6324). The helpful 
comments from James Broadus, John Gates, and two anonymous 
reviewers are acknowledged gratefully. Any opinions, errors, or 
omissions are the author's. 
trasted with the ethical preferences of one who 
personifies an environmental ethic. Relying 
primarily on distinctions already carefully 
explained by the economists Kennett and Sen, I 
discuss reasons why the purest forms of al-
truism and commitment to others undermine 
traditional welfare analyses that are based on 
self-interest and indifference. Section III uses a 
lexicographic ordering for personal income and 
environmental assests to illustrate how ethical 
preferences for the welfare of wildlife and 
future generations "drive a wedge" between 
monetary valuations and Hicksian surpluses. 
The paper is concluded in Section IV with a 
recommendation that contingent valuation 
surveys collect data on underlying motives as 
well as monetary valuations in order to 
distinguish between respondents with egoistic 
and ethical preferences. 
Indifference Curves and Ethical Preferences 
This section contrasts the preferences for two 
behavioral stereotypes of man. As is well 
known, economics's "egoistic man" is 
motivated entirely by self-interest and is indif-
ferent between states of the world that yield 
equal levels of personal utility. In contrast, the 
ethical preferences of "altruistic man" (i.e., the 
psychological antithesis of egoistic man) are 
motivated purely by an unselfish interest 146    October 1986 
in the welfare of others.
1 It should be under-
stood that the realism of these two stereotypes 
is not an issue in this paper. The primary is-
sues here are the implications of assumptions 
about ethical preferences for traditional wel-
fare analysis. 
We begin with Kennett's comprehensive re-
view of the literature on altruism and his im-
portant distinction between "quasi-altruism" 
and "genuine altruism." Many actions that 
appear altruistic are in fact consistent with 
economic models of individual welfare max-
imization. As explained by Kennett, choices 
that benefit others but which are actually 
motivated by expectations of personal benefits 
are quasi-altruistic since they are founded in 
self-interest. For example, if personal discom-
fort alone motivates someone to contribute to 
Greenpeace efforts to eliminate whaling or to a 
program designed to protect ground water 
quality for future generations, then the sole 
intention to reduce discomfort qualifies the 
contribution as an egoistic act. Generalizing 
these examples, quasi-altruism is precisely the 
motivation that some economists now ascribe 
to people when defining existence values (Boyle 
and Bishop; Madariaga and McCon-nell; 
Randall and Stoll). This is manifest when 
existence values are defined rigorously with 
utility-theoretic behavioral models.
2 In this 
context, egoistic man's willingness to pay to 
prevent environmental losses is a proxy for 
compensating notions of Hickian surpluses 
since value is assigned in terms of changes in 
income that hold personal utility constant. 
Egoistic motives and indifference do not in 
theory cover all possible preferences for envi- 
' Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines altruism 
as an "uncalculated consideration of, regard for, or devotion to 
others' interests sometimes in accordance with an ethical principle." 
Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary defines altruism as "devotion to 
the well-being of others as a principle of action." 
2 For example, a person's indirect utility function can be defined as 
(1)  V(P, R, M) 
where P is a vector of prices for market commodities, R is an 
environmental resource that yields personal utility, and M is nominal 
income. If R is the change in the population of a wildlife species or 
in the size of a bequest of natural resources or a clean environment 
to future generations, the Hicksian value, equivalent surplus (ES) is 
defined by: 
(2)  V(P, R° + R, M°) - V(P, R°, M° + ES). 
Similarly, compensating surplus (CS) is defined by: 
(3)  V(P, R°, M°) = V(P, R° + R, M° + CS). 
In either case, the person is indifferent between situations described 
on either side of equations (2) or (3) since personal utility stays the 
same. 
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ronmental assests, however. Indeed, the very 
fact that the well-being of others—wildlife and 
future generations—is at issue at least suggests 
the possibility of genuinely altruistic interests. 
In contrast to quasi-altruism, choices that are 
motivated entirely out of an unselfish interest 
in the well-being of others are genuinely 
a l t r u i s t i c — " t h e r e  m u s t  b e  n o  ...  i d e n t i f i a b l e  
quid pro quo in a truely altruistic act" 
(Kennett, p. 184).
3 Although the altruist may 
also benefit from the choice, the feedback is 
inessential (Kennett; Nagel; Sen 1977). 
The discussion thusfar (including the 
definitions of altruism in footnote 1) suggests 
that altruistic interests in others can involve a 
devotion, or commitment to their welfare which 
is dictated by an ethical principle. Although 
perhaps unfamiliar to most economists, this 
association between altruism and ethical 
commitments is made explicitly in the 
philosophy and psychology literatures (Nagel), 
and in Sen's (1973, 1977, 1979) series of 
articles on the implications of ethical prefer-
ences for traditional welfare analysis. According 
to Sen, as we consider departures from egoistic 
man we must distinguish between the separate 
concepts, sympathy and commitment. Choices 
based on sympathy alone are in an important 
sense egoistic, since personal welfare is 
psychlogically dependent on other's well-
being.
4 In contrast, choices based on 
commitment to others are rooted in what one 
thinks as being right or wrong from a moral, or 
ethical point of view regardless of how one's 
own welfare might be affected. Sen explains 
the serious implications that commitment has 
for welfare analysis: 
“. . . [C]ommitment does involve, in a very real sense, 
counterpreferential choice, destroying the crucial 
assumption that a chosen alternative must be better than 
(or at least as good as) the others for the person 
choosing it, and this would certainly require that 
models be formulated in an essentially different way. . 
. , Commitment is, of course, closely related with one's 
morals. . . . [I]t drives a wedge between personal 
choice and personal welfare, and much of 
3 As Kennett explains, some economists question the existence of 
genuine altruism as a motivation of people's choices. However, to 
reject altruism by defining  choice as an attempt to select an 
alternative that will enhance personal welfare is a tautology. A 
more useful point of view, and one taken up in Section IV, regards 
genuine altruism as a proposition that is amenable to empirical 
testing. 
4 This dependence is exemplified in the work of Collard and 
others where someone else's utility or level of consumption is an 
argument in a person's utility function. Edwards 
traditional economic theory relies on the identity of the 
two," (pp. 328-9) 
Interestingly, Sen considers the possibility of 
commitment to be most important in the 
provision of public goods. Here he challenges 
the assumption that a person's true willing-
ness-to-pay for public goods maximizes his/ 
her personal welfare. This challenge is relevant 
because "the presence of non-gains-
maximizing answers, including truthful ones, 
immediately brings in commitment," (p. 332) 
and, therefore, the aforementioned wedge be-
tween personal choice and personal welfare. 
Consequently, observations of behavior alone, 
or behavioral intentions in contingent valuation 
research, are not sufficient to distinguish 
between egoistic and ethical preferences. This 
dilemma is in effect an identification problem. 
Although Sen does not address environmental 
concerns specifically, his rationale extends to 
ethical principles that involve altruistic 
commitments to wildlife and future generations. 
These principles include fiduciary obligations 
(Manning; Weiss) and moral obligations to 
protect wildlife (Taylor), inter-generational 
equity and fairness (Ferejohn and Page), and the 
perceived rights of animals and future 
generations (Feinberg; Singer; Tribe). 
Some Implications of Ethical Preferences for 
Contingent Valuation Research on Existence 
Values 
Ethical commitments to the welfare of others 
requires a substantial departure from the neo-
classical model of an egoist. Instead, ethicists 
often refer to lexicographic orderings as being 
consistent with choices based on perceptions of 
what is right or just. For example, Tribe 
discusses the rights of animals and future gen-
erations in terms of being preferred lexico-
graphically to personal wants. Similarly, Man-
ning uses lexicographic preferences when 
extending Rawl's theory of justice to the basic 
liberties of future generations. 
Lexicographic orderings are based on binary 
choices among alternatives whereby one 
alternative is ranked before another based on a 
particular rule. A distinctive feature of a lex-
icographic ordering is that no two alternatives 
can be of equal rank. For example, the concept 
of a lexicographic ordering comes from the 
arrangement of words in a dictionary ac- 
Assessment of Existence Values     147 
cording to the alphabetic rule. Clearly, no 
unique spellings can occupy the same rank. 
Similarly, one committed to the rights of wildlife 
and future generations is in effect stating 
preferences according to an ethical rule that 
says more protection is preferred to less re-
gardless of what happens to their personal 
welfare. For example, in binary choices be-
tween levels of protection for the endangered 
right whale, our personification of an environ-
mental ethic would always rank more right 
whales above fewer regardless of what hap-
pens to personal welfare. In both cases indif-
ference between alternative choices is unde-
fined. 
Of course, a lexicographic ordering for the 
welfare of wildlife and future generations could 
be bounded by a constraint on personal welfare 
similar to that discussed by Margolis. However, 
this constraint does not undermine the analysis 
of our hypothetical altruist; it merely limits 
the possibilities to a subset of alternatives. 
In what follows, Sen's conceptual model of 
the implications of ethical commitments for 
welfare analysis is illustrated quantitatively 
using lexicographic orderings as a physical 
model for preference structures. In Figure 1 
alternatives involve personal income, M, and 
numbers of the endangered species of right 
whale, W. First consider a person whose pref-
erences for whales are characterized by the 
indifference curves in Figure 1A. The person is 
motivated solely by expected personal utility 
from knowing that the species is being helped 
(i.e., preservation value) and/or from 
protecting the species for possible use by fu-
ture generations (i.e., bequest value). This 
neoclassical model of choice is representative 
of the framework used in contingent valuation 
studies of existence values (Boyle and Bishop; 
Brookshire, Eubanks and Randall; Hageman; 
Madariaga and McConnell; Walsh, Loomis 
and Gillman). 
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-
to-sell (WTS) are well-defined and  are theoret-
ically sound measures of Hicksian surpluses 
for this egoist. For example, maximum WTP 
to prevent a reduction in the number of right 
whale's from W° to W~ is M°-M~ (Figure 
1A). Since the reference level of utility corre-
sponds to the reduced population size, max-
imum WTP approximates equivalent surplus 
[see equation (2) in footnote 2] such that the 
person is indifferent between alternatives B 
and C. Similarly, compensating surplus, or the Figure 1. Illustrations of (A) indifference and (B) 
lexicographic preferences for the preservation of 
whales. 
minimum WTS to condone a reduction in the 
number of whales from W° to W~, is M 
+ — M° 
[see equation (3) in footnote 2]. In this case, the 
person is indifferent between alternatives A and 
F. 
Next consider an altruist with ethical prefer-
ences for the survival of right whales and for 
income as depicted in Figure IB. M* demar-
cates a standard of living below which prefer-
ences for personal welfare supercede prefer-
ences for whales. Above M*, more whales are 
always preferred to fewer regardless of what 
happens to income.
5 
5 While the preference structure illustrated in Figure IB is 
sufficient for the purpose of this paper, the reader might be inter-
ested in more complex possibilities. For example, thresholds could 
exist whereby preference switches between egoistic and ethical 
interests (see Tribe for a short discussion). This might 
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Several results are interesting. First, Hicks-
ian surpluses are clearly undefined in Figure 
IB. While more right whales are always pre-
ferred to fewer when income is greater than 
M*, more income is certainly preferred to less 
when the number of whales is held constant 
Therefore, no two points in Figure IB are pre-
ferred equally. That is, tradeoffs between per-
sonal income and numbers of whales that 
leave the person indifferent are undefined. 
Curiously, though, WTP and WTS are well- 
defined depending on the location in lexico 
graphic space. For example, if the initial con 
dition is at point A', maximum WTP to 
prevent a reduction in the whale population 
from W° to W~ is M°-M* (Figure IB). How 
ever, the individual is clearly not indifferent 
between situations B' and C' as in Figure 1A; 
C' is preferred. Therefore, while WTP is well- 
defined, it does not  measure equivalent sur 
plus as in the case where preferences are 
mapped by indifference curves. A further im 
plication of this model is that WTS is not even 
defined when income is greater than M* since 
more whales are always preferred to fewer 
whales in this region.
 
i 
Conversely, WTS is well-defined when in-
come is less than M*. In fact, the person de-
picted in Figure IB would sell the whales to 
extinction for any amount of money if given 
the opportunity. For example, E' is preferred to 
D'. However, WTS does not measure com-
pensating surplus since indifference is un-
defined. Furthermore, WTP is undefined when 
income is less than M* since more income is 
always preferred to less in this region. 
The lexicographic model can explain other 
possible features of bid behavior. First, a zero 
WTP is expected for people at (point C') or 
below (point D') their required standard of 
living. 
Second, the model predicts similar bids for 
disparate scenarios. For example, the person 
depicted in Figure IB who just stated a max-
imum WTP of M° — M* to prevent a reduction 
in whale population size from W° to W
- has 
the same bid if asked to value any reduction in 
whale population size from W° (e.g., from W° 
 
happen when the population of a species is reduced to the en-
dangered level. Also, a person could have first order preferences as 
depicted in Figure IB, but also have a second order preference to 
prefer preferring whale preservation regardless of the level of 
persona! income. See Sen (1977) and Jeffrey for discussions of 
higher order preferences and meta-rankings. Finally, Margolis and 
Opaluch discuss the interaction of separate preferences for self and 
others and its implications for allocative efficiency. Edwards 
to W
=). This differs from the utility maximization 
model since more preservation always yields 
more utility, ceteris paribus, although at a 
decreasing marginal rate. For example, 
maximum WTP to prevent a reduction in whale 
population from W° to W
= is M° —M 
= which is 
greater than the maximum WTP to prevent a 
smaller reduction to W~ (Figure 1A). 
Finally, the lexicographic model for the 
structure of ethical preferences provides a 
framework to hypothesize about alleged 
anomalous responses in contingent valuation 
experiments on existence values. For example, 
since WTS is undefined for ethical preferences 
when income exceeds a minimum standard of 
living, an altruist commited to the welfare of 
wildlife and future generations is expected to 
protest against contingent markets when asked 
for minimum WTS by either refusing to bid, 
bidding zero dollars, or bidding an extremely 
high amount.
6 It is interesting that researchers 
choose not to include WTS questions in 
contingent valuation studies of existence values 
even though the notion is well-defined by 
neoclassical theory. 
Concluding Remarks: Another Opportunity for 
Contingent Valuation Research 
The contingent valuation method is being used 
increasingly to provide policy makers with 
heretofore unknown data on existence values 
for wildlife and future generations (Boyle and 
Bishop; Brookshire, Eubanks and Randall; 
Hageman; Madariaga and McConnell; Walsh, 
Loomis and Gillman). In these studies, re-
spondents' hypothetical choices expressed in 
terms of WTP are assumed either implicitly or 
explicitly in utility-theoretic models to ap-
proximate personal benefits. However, the 
above extension of Kennett's and Sen's argu-
ments about genuine altruism and commitment 
illustrate that bid data alone do not identify 
either egoistic or ethical preferences. This 
identification problem presents a fundamental 
dilemma to policy analysts who want to in-
clude contingent valuation assessments of ex- 
6 Other hypotheses concerning anomalous bids to contingent 
valuations querries (e.g., protest bids, endowment bids, conservative 
estimates) involve psychological mechanisms and perceived 
property rights which distort egoistic valuations (Bishop, Heber-
lein and Kealy; Knetsch and Sinden). The hypothesis suggested 
here is consistent with ethical commitments to others. 
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istence values into comprehensive analyses of 
environmental policies—although valuations 
are expressed in fungible units, ethical values 
are not homologous with egoistic values, and, 
therefore, do not fit comfortably into efficiency 
analyses.
7 The ambiguity substantially weakens 
the credibility of research that prides itself on a 
rigorous approach to measuring Hicksian 
values. 
One may also view the identification problem 
as an opportunity for economists to define the 
purview of economic analysis such that 
complaints about our predilection to monetize 
environmental  values  will be  ill-conceived. 
Whether there are any altruists with ethical 
commitments to wildlife and future generations 
is actually an empirical matter that needs to be 
tested. Fortunately, in some cases the null 
hypothesis that preference structures are not 
lexicographic  can be evaluated  strictly from 
straight forward rankings of alternative states  
of the  world.   For example,  ranking fewer 
whales and more income above initial 
conditions is inconsistent with ethical prefer-
ences for whale preservation. Unfortunately, 
though, other orderings of alternatives from 
least to most prefered can be accommodated by 
either egoistic or ethical preferences. As 
recommended generally by Sen, researchers 
need to elicit further introspection and com-
munication from respondents to surveys on how 
and why they decided on a particular preference   
ranking.   Did  they  consider  the tradeoffs 
between changes in income and environmental 
assets or did they only consider changes in the 
latter? Does the notion indifference  fit  into  
their  choices?  In  addition, methods designed 
to measure attitudes and a person's 
commitments to specific principles and groups 
need to be assimilated into the design of 
contingent choice experiments. For ex- 
7 It's helpful to recognize the distinction between homologies and 
analogies that biological taxonomists stress. Homologous species 
have a common lineage or derivation. In contrast, species that are 
analogous in appearance but not related evolutionarily are not 
homologous. If we view value concepts as "species," egoistic and 
ethical values that are measured in monetary units are analogous but 
not homologous concepts since they are derived from distinctly 
different types of preferences. This confusion between analogies and 
homologies also arises on the subject of intrinsic values. Certain 
ethicists such as Tribe, Taylor and Godfrey-Smith describe the 
intrinsic value of wildlife and future generations as a property which 
is independent of what anyone else might assign to them. In contrast, 
economists define the intrinsic value of wildlife and future 
generations as the value that is assigned to them according to their 
capacity to provide personal utility to the valuer. Depending on 
whose typology you look at, even option value—a personal use 
value—is classified with existence values under the intrinsic value 
category (Fisher and Raucher). 150    October 1986 
ample, Kellert's work on quantitative scales for 
moralistic and utilitarian attitudes toward 
animals should help to identify those who do 
not fit the neoclassical model of man, if they 
exist at all. 
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